Ever provocative, Arnaud be Borchgrave writes that re Iraq & Iran the "Fifth Horseman" of the Apocalypse has appeared. He salutes Bush summoning former Democratic Congressman Lee Hamilton and Bush 41 top man James Baker to head an Iraq study group. He argues that 43 : (a) is losing Iraq to Iranian influence; (b) slighted Pakistan via his nuke deal with India; (c) ignores future Palestinian rocket threat despite Israel's fence; (d) should thus negotiate secretly with Iran, despite Iran's current president being a "fifth horseman" and despite UN sanctions being doomed from the start. He argues that 43 should pursue a geopolitical bargain with Iran that prevents a terror axis from Hamas to Baghdad to Tehran to Islamabad. He concludes that if the US cannot strike a deal, Israel will take out Iran's nuke assets, and fears that $200 oil will result.
In agreeing to talk with Iran, 43 has accepted one suggestio: negotiations--except the talks will be public. (The Fifth Horseman was about a Qaddhafi plot to nuke
NYC; not bad, but not nearly as good as two other books by Dominique Lappierre
& Larry Collins (Oh, Jerusalem & Is Paris Burning?).
My thoughts re AdeB's points (sorry for small format type, but I pasted my comments from Outlook, having commented on this in response to an e-mail sent me earlier by an LTFC reader):
1. Iraq. Liberal
democracy is not in the offing. Partition will probably prove necessary. The key is to
marginalize Moqtada al-Sadr & his allies. Bullets OR ballots--not
both.
2. Iran. AdeB is right that diplomacy or
sanctions--or both--cannot stop the mullahs. No strong, determined proliferator
has ever been stopped by either, nor by treaties. Because we waited so long we
are left with horrid choices. Before end of 43's term either Israel will strike
or we will. If Israel is smart they will get us to do it by telling us they
will if we do not, and US will be blamed anyway, so why not do a more thorough
job? 43 will punt only if Giuliani or McCain wins in 2008, as they can be
trusted to act.
3. India. The US deal is a must. Pakistan does not get a similar one
because they have significant Islamist presence in circles of
power. Yes, this will considerably irk Pakistan, but we are caught there, as elsewhere, between the proverbial rock and hard place.
4. Oil. $200 oil will not happen. The price system
constrains even oligopolists. A huge price hike would be casus belli
for war against OPEC regimes. In the event, cartel price cheating will happen
if oil gets anywhere near $100, let alone $200.
5. Israel. Israel will finish the fence. AdeB is right that rockets will fly over the fence. But
Israel's great fear is suicide bombers, not rockets. Israel has concluded,
rightly, that in neither Hamas nor PLO is there a potential partner for
meaningful peace negotiations. This is the price paid for awarding Arafat power
after 1991, despite Arafat having backed Saddam, instead of freezing him out
forever.
6. Advice. Which brings me to the scariest item in AdeB's
article. Bush desperately does need advice. But Lee Hamilton, a dovish guy who
led the charge on Iran-contra, which criminalized a foreign policy dispute, and
James Baker, architect of the post-Gulf War disaster are awful candidates. In
1991 we had 540,000 troops in Iraq--enough to keep even General Shinseki happy
(he wanted 200,000 this time). We could have backed the uprising that Bush 41
called for. Instead we betrayed them & let Saddam butcher those who rose
up, having foolishly trusted us. Which explains the uphill battle we have faced
in winning Iraqi trust. Arafat--who backed Saddam in 1991--should have been kept in Tunis to rot in
exile. Once Saddam torched 700 Kuwaiti oil wells the predicate was laid for
expanding the war aim beyond mere expulsion from Kuwait. And think of these three changes from 1991: (1) no
fedayeen were organized to resist then; (2) no al-Qa'ida then; (3) no al-Jazeera. It would have
been a cakewalk. The insanely reviled "neos" wanted to topple Saddam then, but were scorned by their critics.
7. 1991. We then should have destroyed Iran, Syria &
Hezbollah--with Israel--in southern Lebanon. And told the Saudis if they did
not like it we would topple them, too. (Ideally, Saddam would have invaded
Saudi in 1991, destroyed the royals and Wahhabis. We could then have retaken
it, and given King Hussein's clan back Mecca & Medina, that they lost to the
al-Saud/Wahhabi alliance in 1925. Then there would have been no spread of Sunni fanaticism.)
8. Bottom Line. In sum, we pay the price today of failing to fix matters in 1991, when it would have been a lot easier, less risky and cheaper.