The EMP Commission has released a new report (see EMPC website, 208 pages), presenting in great detail more on the danger to the continental US from serial supercharged pulses of electromagnetic radiation (EMP)emitted by a high-altitude nuclear explosion. Its first report, released in 2004, formed the scenario basis for the Prologue to my book, The Long War Ahead and the Short War Upon Us. A single Hiroshima-size nuclear weapon detonated 300 miles about the center of the CONUS will fry most electrical systems within a 1,470-mile geographic radius. An EMP 8/9/08 editorial by the Wall Street Journal cited this latest report and urged action.
EMP comes in three sequential stages, of which two, E1 & E2, are pulsed bursts of energy that are equally harmful at low explosive yields. E3 is not a pulse, but rather is akin to geomagnetic storms, which can be very destructive; E3 is thus sensitive to variations in explosive yield. EMP can create imbalances within the grid that cause the system to shut down and inflict severe damage. Because newer infrastructures rely greatly on digital technologies, they use far fewer personnel to run them; thus, in a crisis, there are far fewer surplus workers to spare to rapidly reconstitute damaged parts of the system.
Perhaps the strongest warning issued by the panel was on how infrastructure inter-dependency can radically increase the time needed to recover after an EMP attack:
It is important to note, however, that safeguards against single point failures generally depend on the proper functioning of the rest of the national infrastructure, a plausible assumption for high reliability infrastructure systems when they experience random, uncorrelated single point failures....Planning for multiple failures, particularly when they are closely correlated in time, is much less common.
The panel looked at ten areas to assess EMP vulnerability: electric power, telecommunications, banking & finance, petroleum & natural gas, transportation, food, water, emergency services, space, government. Our ability to assess vulnerability is complicated by our inability to model complex interdependent failures:
No currently available modeling and simulation tools exist that can adequately address the consequences of disruptions and failures occurring simultaneously in different critical infrastructures that are dynamically interdependent. Many infrastructure models that do exist are local to regional in scope.
Electric power drives virtually all infrastructures in the United States. Backup is provided by generators whose life typically is 72 hours or less, and/or batteries with a life of a few hours at most. Economic impact can be substantial even in short blackouts, with losses between 18 & 60 percent of production in the affected area. Were a 70 percent grid outage to result from an EMP strike, given that American GDP is upwards of $14 trillion, losses from a protracted blackout could range from $2 to $6 trillion (my calculation, based upon figures above). Digital control systems run many critical applications, and are highly vulnerable to EMP unless hardened against EMP. In the past 20 years the margin of excess capacity of emergency needs has halved, from 20 to 10 percent; also, wind power growth places unpredictable demands upon the system, increasing reliability problems. High-power transformers that step up and down voltage levels as electric current travels between power generation and customer distribution are often customized and produced overseas, with lead time of about one year needed to order one; there are 2,000 transformers in the US electric grid. As with computers, power systems that are digitally controlled can suffer extensive damage if improper shutdown procedures are followed; grid local imbalances can thus inflict severe damage. Thus the electric grid transmission system that links generators and consumers is "highly vulnerable" to EMP. The panel listed a set of remedial measures that appear to cost in aggregate perhaps $5 billion; at twice or even thrice that amount the investment is a bargain.
Telecommunications networks are another major potential weak spot. Backup power typically lasts 4 to 72 hours. Banking & finance networks are highly-automated electronic digital systems. These networks are impossible to operate without communications connectivity. Whereas a generation ago a 10 million share trading day on the New York Stock Exchange was huge, today trading volume averages 3 billion shares per day. Communications networks carry some 70 trillion bytes of data daily (equivalent to 140 high-end PC hard drives). There were 371,000 ATMs as of 2003, versus 14,000 in 1979. Fedwire, the network that links 7,500 banks & other depositary institutions, carries 528,000 transactions daily, averaging $3.9 million, for a total value of $2.1 trillion daily. In 2004, NASDAQ, the over-the-counter market clearing house, executed over 950 million trades valued at $3.7 trillion; the NYSE traded slightly less. Other specialized financial networks also trade trillions of dollars in value. The industry is well-protected against localized outages, with significant backup redundancy. But the industry's assets are not hardened against EMP, and likely are highly vulnerable. Our financial services industry is so automated that reversion to a cash economy may not be feasible in event of a protracted outage; we might revert to a barter economy. A major disruption for even one day, let alone weeks or months, would be, the panel warned, "catastrophic." The Treasury Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission agree that even a single day without power could cause wide-scale disruption and risk to critical markets. Were electronic systems needed to recover lost data crippled, making essential records inaccessible, "irreocoverable loss of operating data and essential records on a large scale would likely result in catastrophic and irreversible damage to U.S. society."
Petroleum & natural gas is transported around America by a physical infrastructure of 180,000 miles of interstate natural gas pipelines and 55,000 miles of oil pipelines, with 501,000 oil wells, 274 offshore oil rigs and 149 oil refineries (which produce 23 percent of global refined oil). Pipelines carry 50 percent of crude oil and tankers another 46 percent; tankers move most of the refined product. America's oil imports come in to 4,000 offshore platforms, 2,000 terminals, at 185 ports served by 4,000 tankers worldwide. Natural gas is extracted from 448,000 wells at 63,000 fields; there are more than 500 processing plants and 1,400 condensate plants. Energy transport systems are run by specialized digital control systems known as SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition); SCADA systems are highly vulnerable to EMP. Backup systems can run the energy infrastructure for a few days.
Transportation is another source of vulnerability. Class I railroads (over $319.3 million operating revenue) carried 1.8 billion tons in 2003; major categories of freight are: coal, 44%, and chemicals, at 9%. Coal supplies on site can cover up to a month, but some plants have only days on site. Repair and recovery of railroads would take days to weeks, with manual control able to operate at 10 to 20 percent of normal capacity. Between manufacturer and consumer, nearly 80% of manufactured goods transit via truck. EMP would disable some of the nation's 130 million cars and 90 million trucks; modern cars have up to 100 microprocessors controlling operations. Some 100 deep-draft ports move 95% of overseas trade and 75% by monetary value; typically, ports have 10 to 20 days fuel on the premises. Air travel incorporates 72 U.S.-certified carriers, employing 642,000, and in 2001 carried 560 million domestic passengers 701 billion passenger miles; commercial air freight added 22 billion ton miles. (Today's commercial flight total is around 740 million passengers.) Aircraft have lots of redundancy. Air traffic control radars have limited redundancy. A major EMP strike could bring air travel to a standstill.
Food growing requires immense water table and electric grid support; the latter is also essential for food processing, primarily for refrigeration. Supermarkets are the weakest link, because the increased reliance on just-in-time delivery (using electronic databases) means that supermarkets have 1 to 3 days supply. The nation's 2.1 million farms have about 1,000,000 acres under construction; 225,000 food stores and 850,000 eating establishments. In 1900, 30% of Americans were farmers; today the figure is 2%, meaning that there is a shortage of skilled farm personnel to help in a crisis. Farm productivity is up 50-fold. There are not enough workers to process food as was done in earlier times. Starvation, in event the food infrastructure collapses, would impair mobility and strength within a few days. After 4 or 5 days judgment would be impaired, after a fortnight people would be incapacitated, and death results in one to two months. Most gas-powered ovens built since the mid-1980s would not work, and they cannot be ignited with a match. Millions could be at risk.
The water infrastructure needs electricity to run pumps that enable water to run against the pull of gravity (as in skyscrapers). SCADA systems are also critical here. Irrigation & cooling are 80% of water consumption. The water infrastructure includes over 75,000 dams & reservoirs, 168,000 water treatment facilities and 19,500 wastewater treatment facilities. Thousands of miles of pipes, aqueducts and distribution & sewer lines are used for transport. Filtration and disinfectant systems require electric power to run. Stores typically carry 1 to 3 days supply.
Emergency services are provided by close to 2 million firefighters, policeman and emergency medical personnel. Emergency communications have enhanced backup, but are dependent upon other infrastructures functioning. Space systems orbiting at low altitudes are vulnerable to EMP. Communications and broadcasting satellites in geosynchronous orbit (at an altitude of 22,300 miles remain stationary over a point on the Earth; GEOs orbit above the equator and are too far from any low-altitude nuclear detonation to be affected. Low-Earth orbit satellites (LEOs) are vulnerable to initial EMP, and also to radiation damage if they fly through a zone within range of a detonation emitting EMP, for some time after the explosion. Government depends upon all the above services, and is thus vulnerable. Public dissemination of information is a vital part of post-attack management. People can panic in the face of remote, but unexplained, dangers: After the 2001 anthrax attacks people took precautions, despite astronomical odds against their becoming victims. People post-attack want to know about their family, understand what has transpired, and that the situation is being managed by the authorities. Otherwise panic, or even post-traumatic stress, can result.
Assessment. A key factor in vulnerability is the "edge effect": neighboring communities help those in distress. This works for storms and other natural disasters, or even for a local terror attack. It will not work given a nationwide major disruption of key services. The Commission concludes that while an EMP attack on civilian infrastructure is "a serious problem" it "can be managed by coordinated and focused efforts between industry and government. More to the point: Iran's military leaders know about this phenomenon, which has been written up in Iranian military journals. Iran has tested launching missiles from a barge in the Caspian Sea. All current nuclear powers also know about this, including Russia and China. Quite apart from potential significant loss of human life, should collapse of multiple infrastructures occur after an EMP strike, trillions of dollars in value would be erased. A modest investment, probably a small fraction of potential exposure, could add a lot to America's security.
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